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Abstract
Should governments subsidize entry to promote competition? In general, theory
models cannot determine whether entry under the free-entry condition is socially ex-
cessive, optimal, or insu¢ cient. In this paper I propose an empirical framework to
evaluate welfare consequences of policy intervention through entry in di⁄erentiated
product markets, with a case study of the US Medicare HMO market. In endogenizing
￿rms￿entry-exit decision, a technical breakthrough is to explicitly incorporate ￿rm het-
erogeneity by employing a sequential move game. This enables us to exploit detailed
￿rm level data and makes policy simulations relevant. I ￿nd no evidence of socially
excessive entry. The government may achieve higher social welfare by expanding the
program.
1I am thankful to Leemore Dafny, David Dranove, Michael Mazzeo, Aviv Nevo, and Robert Porter for
guidance. Discussions with Raquel Bernal and Rosa Matzkin were also helpful. I am also thankful to the
CMS sta⁄ for kindly providing the data ￿les and answering my inquiries. Support from the Center for the
Study of Industrial Organization is gratefully acknowledged. E-mail: s.maruyama@unsw.edu.au.
11 Introduction
Should governments subsidize entry to promote competition? Advocates of market com-
petition often claim more deregulation and liberalization of markets. On the other hand,
not many argue that competition is so welfare enhancing that governments should intervene
further to bring about more entrants and intensify competition. Actually, from the social
welfare point of view, it is not straightforward to conclude whether additional entry generates
positive or negative welfare impact.
The theory literature of industrial organization ￿nds that free entry does not guarantee
the socially optimum number of entrants. As discussed in Spence (1976) and Mankiw and
Whinston (1986), in the homogeneous product setting, free entry can lead to socially ex-
cessive entry. Additional entry would expand consumer surplus with lower prices, but, at
the same time, it reduces the market shares of other ￿rms ("business stealing") and leads
to an ine¢ cient replication of ￿xed costs. In di⁄erentiated product markets, however, the
direction of bias is unclear, because consumers￿appreciation of variety from entry causes a
trade-o⁄. Consider, for example, a price subsidy to attract more entry in order to promote
competition. New entrants enhance consumer surplus through more intensive competition
￿ lower prices, better product quality, and more variety. On the other hand, new entry
lowers social welfare by duplicative set-up costs and "business stealing" from incumbents. In
addition, the price subsidy causes market distortion. It is an empirical task to quantify these
e⁄ects and to determine if the government can achieve higher social welfare by encouraging
or discouraging entry.
In spite of its policy importance, this empirical issue has not been well explored. In
this paper I propose an empirical framework to evaluate welfare consequences of policy
intervention through entry, using the national data of the US Medicare HMO market for
the years 2003 and 2004. By endogenizing ￿rms￿entry-exit decision, the framework enables
2evaluating not only welfare consequences of direct intervention in the number of entrants
but also welfare impacts of policy changes through entry. To make policy simulations even
more relevant, my model incorporates product di⁄erentiation and ￿rm heterogeneity.
In most real world cases, neither products nor ￿rms are homogeneous. When analyzing
welfare consequences of entry, the resulting welfare distributions and policy implications are
more meaningful with the heterogeneity we actually observe, e.g. whether a new entrant
in a market is a large chain ￿rm or a small not-for-pro￿t one and whether it o⁄ers generic
minimal service or highly di⁄erentiated tailor-made service. Nevertheless, previous empirical
analyses of entry assume limited or no ￿rm heterogeneity due to analytical limitations. A
technical breakthrough proposed in my empirical framework is to explicitly incorporate ￿rm
heterogeneity into the welfare analysis by employing a sequential move game. This progress
has a signi￿cant implication for the application of empirical entry models. That is, unlike the
previous analyses, I can exploit detailed ￿rm level data and draw relevant policy implications
from various policy simulations. For example, performing a welfare simulation of subsidies,
taxes, entry regulations, or other competition policies and evaluating its welfare impact
through entry is beyond the scope of previous models.
The US Medicare HMO market is one of the most fruitful applications, because the prod-
ucts are highly di⁄erentiated and there is a large scope for government intervention in regard
to entry. The US Medicare is the federal entitlement program that provides comprehensive
health insurance coverage to individuals age 65 and older and certain disabled people (here-
after "Medicare eligibles"). Currently Medicare features private health insurance plans in
addition to a government-administered fee-for-service plan (hereafter "traditional Medicare
plan"). Most of the private plans are HMOs (Health Maintenance Organizations, explana-
tion provided in the data section). HMO plans make their entry-exit and price decisions
in each county annually, by taking into consideration the responses of the demand side and
competing ￿rms. Medicare eligibles make their choice between the government plan and the
3private plan(s) available in their county, considering each plan￿ s monthly premium, if any,
and insurance coverage, e.g. whether it covers prescription drugs.
Government payments to Medicare HMOs have been an intense policy debate. While
private plans are allowed to charge some monthly premiums, which I use as a price in the
demand estimation, their main source of revenue is the per enrollee government payment,
which can be regarded as a price subsidy. The rate of the government payment is ￿xed ex
ante and varies across counties (but not across plans within a county). Since the rate of the
payment directly a⁄ects price cost margin of HMOs, the government can utilize the payment
rate to in￿ uence the number of competing HMOs, the quality and coverage of their services,
the size of the Medicare HMO program, and, as the ￿nal target, the distribution of social
welfare. Though the socially optimal level of the payment rate has always been an intense
policy debate, there has never been an empirical study to evaluate welfare consequences of
payment rate changes through entry.
My empirical strategy is as follows. All estimations are at the plan-county-year level. I
￿rst estimate a discrete choice demand model of the Medicare health insurance market. The
consumer surplus is calculated using these results. Second, by using the estimated demand
parameters and assumptions on ￿rms￿price-setting behavior, I back out the health plans￿
marginal costs. Third, because the entry game is played not only by the observed ￿rms but
also ￿rms that choose not to enter and do not appear in the data, the pool of potentially
entering HMOs is created. Then I estimate HMO pro￿t functions with a sequential move
entry game that guarantees a unique pure-strategy equilibrium. The observed market struc-
ture and the inclusion of the demand model into the framework allow me to identify the
level of ￿xed and variable pro￿ts, despite the lack of cost information. Finally, I perform
counterfactual simulations, where all the consumers and HMOs re-optimize their decisions
on plan choice, price, and entry-exit in response to an exogenous change, which gives me a
new market equilibrium. Since my data set has only a couple of time points and dealing with
4agents￿detailed heterogeneity is still a considerable challenge for dynamic modeling, I follow
the customary approach in the empirical entry literature and employ no scope of dynamics.
As the main result of the research, I ￿nd no evidence of socially excessive entry, which
suggests that the consumer e¢ ciency gain from having more variety and competition matches
or maybe even outweighs the social ine¢ ciency from duplicative set-up costs of ￿rms. This
suggests that the government should keep at least this level of entry. Though net social
welfare is not quite responsive to the level of entry, the indicated changes in welfare distri-
bution caused by entry are notable. In addition, the payment simulation suggests that the
government may achieve higher social welfare by expanding the program. I also ￿nd that
the national welfare gain of having private health insurance plans in Medicare is around ten
billion dollars a year in 2003 and 2004, which is overall consistent with the preceding study
by Town and Liu (2003).
2 Empirical Entry Literature
The study I follow most closely is Berry and Waldfogel (1999), one of few studies that apply
the empirical entry literature to welfare analysis. They model the broadcasting industry as a
homogeneous product market,2 and quantify social ine¢ ciency from free entry. Dutta (2005)
advances their work to the di⁄erentiated product case. Her study of the pharmaceutical
industry in India performs counterfactual simulations of entry and ￿nds no evidence of
excessive entry. Her empirical framework is similar to mine, except that her estimation still
heavily relies on the assumption on certain ￿rm homogeneity. I build on these studies by
incorporating full ￿rm heterogeneity.
In the long history of the empirical entry literature, ￿rm heterogeneity has not been
2In their framework, listeners￿demand for broadcasting is modeled as a discrete choice demand, but the
industry￿ s primary output, advertisement, is treated as homogeneous product.
5fully incorporated in entry models for several reasons. How to deal with multiple equilibria
is one of the largest issues in this literature. To guarantee certain equilibrium properties
the researchers have speci￿ed the econometric setting in a very restrictive way such as ho-
mogenous product markets, symmetric games, simple reduced-form pro￿t functions, and an
in￿nite pool of homogeneous potential entrants. Computational burden is another di¢ culty
in this literature, as the introduction of ￿rm heterogeneity requires a researcher to estimate
large asymmetric game models.
Facing these di¢ culties, various approaches are proposed. Berry (1992) avoids this prob-
lem by introducing ￿rm heterogeneity into the ￿xed cost part, thus, keeping his game sym-
metric. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) and Town and Liu (2003) follow the same approach.
Dutta (2005) incorporates ￿rm heterogeneity by categorizing ￿rms into three types, but,
within each type, ￿rms are symmetric. Mazzeo (2002) models ￿rm heterogeneity as endoge-
nous choice of location and product types. Seim (2001, 2004) proposes the use of incomplete
information setting to alleviate computational burden. Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) pursue
a more ￿ exible model of ￿rm heterogeneity and identities, by not making point identifying
assumptions on equilibrium selection. All of these studies, however, still use reduced-form
pro￿t function and/or certain symmetry assumptions in entry games, which is a restriction,
especially when a researcher￿ s goal is welfare simulations. By employing a sequential move
game and avoiding multiple equilibria, my model makes it possible that HMOs have di⁄erent
cost structures and product characteristics across markets.
Another key feature of my model is structural combination of the demand and supply
sides, which brings a signi￿cant advantage ￿counterfactual simulations by extrapolation. It
enables a researcher to analyze how a policy change a⁄ects entry and exit, market competition
and, in turn, social welfare in each section of the entire market. I am not the ￿rst to nest
demand into an entry model. Reiss and Spiller (1989) estimate the demand and supply of
airline services simultaneously, but for carefully selected small homogenous product markets.
6Berry and Waldfogel (1999) explicitly model pro￿t functions with price and quantity and
allowing ￿rms to vary across ￿xed costs. Another study along this line is Town and Liu
(2003). They quantify the welfare impact of Medicare HMOs, by combining structural
models of demand and entry. Though they model the market as a di⁄erentiated product
market, their supply side model does not fully incorporate ￿rm heterogeneity and detailed
entry simulations are beyond their scope.
3 Data
Medicare is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (hereafter CMS)
and the main body of the data set comes from the CMS. The three main data sources are
the following: (1) the Enrollment data at the county-plan level, (2) the Monthly Report
data, and (3) the Plan Bene￿t Package data (PBP data) (For the detailed discussion and
description of the data, see Maruyama 2007).
3.1 The Unit of Observation
The unit of observation is a plan-county-year. I follow the CMS in considering the county
the market de￿nition. The time points I use are the years 2003 and 2004.3 These years
are relatively stable and suitable for this research because, before this period, the market
experienced a huge exodus of HMOs and this period is su¢ ciently before the implementation
of the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act in 2006, while these
years observe considerable entry and exit across counties within Medicare.
In the CMS data ￿les, there is a clear distinction between organization, plan (or contract,
as the CMS sometimes calls it), and product (or plan, as the CMS sometimes calls it).
3Information from the year 2002 is also used to identify incumbents in creating the pool of potential
entrants.
7Table 1: The Number of HMO Plans and their Market Share in 2004
Number of plans Enrollment Share
HMO (Health Maintenance Organizations) 145 4,684,304 85%
PPO (Preferred Provider Organizations) 41 119,110 2%
Other Medicare+Choice types 70 266,247 5%
Other prepaid plan types 44 428,833 8%
Total prepaid plans 300 5,498,494 100%
Entire Medicare eligibles 42,992,077
Source: Medicare Managed Care Contract Report and the Enrollment data
The organization is the governing body: for example Paci￿care, Aetna, Humana, etc. In
the Medicare program, each organization may enter into one or more plans (or contracts).
Each of these plans is assigned a unique contract number by the CMS. In addition, each
plan can o⁄er more than one product ￿ that is, a particular bene￿t package with unique
bene￿ts, copays, premiums and service counties. I focus this study on the plan level analysis,
because many important variables such as county enrollment are reported at the plan level.4
Product level information is aggregated to the plan level in each county, by choosing the
product with the largest enrollment as the representative product. For ambiguous cases, I
average the variables across products, but such cases are rare.
3.2 The Sample Population
Under the current Medicare program, several types of private health plans are eligible to
participate.5 Among others, HMOs (Health Maintenance Organizations) are dominant play-
ers. An HMO forms its network of health provides to enhance its purchasing power and to
restrict and manage the ￿ ow of its patients. A Medicare HMO receives a monthly payment
4Also the plan level analysis works favorably in reconciling the demand and supply side models. While
HMOs are likely to maximize their pro￿ts at the plan or organization level, for the demand side, the product
level analysis may be more reasonable because consumers are more likely to choose a product than a plan
or an organization.
5Currently, the private part of the program is referred to as the Medicare Advantage (formerly
Medicare+Choice) program and private health plans are referred to as Medicare Advantage plans.
8for each enrollee from the CMS and, in return, it is responsible for providing all covered
services and takes full ￿nancial responsibility for the actual costs generated. Because of
these patient management device and ￿nancial incentive, Medicare HMOs are supposed to
be more e¢ cient than the government fee-for-service insurance plan.
Table 1 shows that HMOs￿enrollment share within the private health plans is 85 % in
2004. While I use most plan types in the demand estimation, I focus my supply side model
on HMOs because the other types￿pro￿t structure may di⁄er from HMOs￿and their shares
are small. I estimate pro￿ts only for HMOs, and throughout this research, the presence of
the non-HMO types is treated as exogenous.
I choose the observations used in this research as follows.
Omitted Plan Types With various types of private Medicare plans, I exclude the plan
types that are regarded as not open to regular Medicare bene￿ciaries, such as PACE (Pro-
gram of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly) plans and long-term care Demonstration plans.
Dropping these di⁄erent type plans excludes only 3% of the entire private plan enrollment.
Choosing Operating Plans Next, at the plan-county-year level, I select operating plans.
In the CMS Enrollment data ￿les, individual members are assigned to counties according to
the reported residence. This implies that for many counties there are an unrealistically high
number of health plans with very low enrollment. I include a plan-county observation in the
data set as a valid observation if it satis￿es both of the following: (1) it is in a plan￿ s o¢ cial
service counties under its contract to the government and (2) it has at least 50 members.6
A very small number of observations with missing values are also dropped. Then, I recal-
culate the market size by subtracting the dropped observations￿enrollment from the original
6I set this threshold higher than the previous studies to make the data more stable; Town and Liu [2003],
for example, de￿ne the operating HMOs in a county as HMOs with at least 12 members if the county has
fewer than 5,000 eligibles and 35 members otherwise.
9numbers of Medicare eligibles. This completes the data set for the demand estimation.
Creating Potential Entrants In my supply side model, all the potentially operating
plans play a one-shot entry game each year. The pool of potential entrants consists of the
operating HMOs observed in the data and hypothetical potential entrants that I add to the
data set.
I limit my entry model to entrants that are operating in other areas in the same state or
the same MSA.7 This means I exclude: a) entrants from outside the state or MSA and b)
brand-new entrants from the commercial sector. The potential bias due to this exclusion,
however, seems to be minimal as a ￿rst order approximation. First, no entry from outside
the state or MSA is observed during my sample periods. Second, although each Medicare
HMO plan has its main entity in the commercial sector, not much brand-new entry from
the commercial sector occurs during my sample periods. For 2004, for example, out of 1,020
plan-county-year observations in the data set, only ￿ve plans are brand-new.
The pool of potential entrants consists of the following six types: (1) plans that actually
operate in the county in the year, (2) plans that operate in the same MSA in the year, (3)
plans that operate in the same state in the year, (4) plans that operate in the county in the
previous year, (5) plans that operate in the same MSA in the previous year, and (6) plans that
operate in the same state in the previous year. Thus, in the supply estimation, observations
that qualify as one of (2) to (6) but not (1) are created and included as "hypothetical
entrants".89 The plan level characteristics of the newly created potential entrants are the
same as the original plan. For the product level characteristics, I pick the product with the
7There exist multi-state MSAs. Entry from outside the state but in the same MSA is considered.
8Thus, the term, hypothetical potential entrants, is a concept di⁄erent from incumbency. A hypothetical
potential entrant that operates in the previous year but not this year plays the entry game as an incumbent.
9As a result, the supply data set has many counties with one or more hypothetical entrants but with no
observed entrant. These counties are kept in the sample so as to avoid unwanted selection bias and make
use of information value from the fact that no entry occurs.
10Table 2: The Sample Size
2003 2004 Total
Demand data set
Number of plans 196 207 207
Number of plans (HMO) 133 138 138
Number of counties 829 938 948
Number of plan-counties 1,478 1,811 3,289
Number of plan-counties (HMO) 997 1,094 2,091
Entry estimation data set
Number of HMO plans 133 138 138
Number of counties 2,574 2,501 2,630
Number of plan-counties 9,617 9,927 19,544
largest enrollment under the plan as the representative product.
3.3 Variables, Sample Size, and Summary Statics
The PBP data set has a great amount of detailed information about the additional bene-
￿ts a product o⁄ers. To summarize this information, I perform a factor analysis. Based
on the results, I aggregate relevant bene￿t variables into six bene￿t composite variables:
drug, education, physicals, peripheral1, peripheral2, and screenings (see Maruyama 2007
for the detailed discussion). The payment rate data in the original CMS data sets is the
standardized, payment base in each county. The actual payment for a particular enrollee is
determined by certain formulae which take demographic and risk factors into consideration.
In this study, I use not the payment base but the average of actual payments in the county
calculated by using demographic and risk factor information.
Table 2 shows the sample size for the demand and supply estimation. Table 3 shows de-
scriptive statistics of selected variables. The minimum of payment rates is negative because,
since 2003, the premium can be "negative" in the form of a premium rebate. A comparison
of the average and standard deviation of monthly premiums and payment rates indicates
that the payment from the government is the primary source of revenues, but private plans
11Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables
Average Std.dev. Min Max
(2003) (2004)
Plan enrollees 3,060 3,339 2,833 7,715 50 142,050
Plan market share 0.063 0.066 0.061 0.070 0.0002 0.447
Monthly premium 51.3 58.9 45.0 47.5 ￿62.6 189.0
Payment rate 549.4 530.7 564.7 91.1 296.7 1067.5
bene￿t: drug 0.61 0.55 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
The number of observations: 3289 plan-county-years. Monthly premium and payment rate are in dollars.
take various strategies in regard to their premiums.
Table 4 shows the distribution of observations and the average numbers of market size,
payment rates, and monthly premiums by the number of observed entrants in a county. The
majority of observations are from concentrated markets. The table suggests that counties
with larger demands and/or higher payment rates attract more private plans. Also, the more
competitive a county is, the lower premiums they charge.
Table 4: Sample Distribution, Average Market Size, Average Premiums, and Average Pay-
ment Rates by the Number of Plans in Each County: 2004
Number of Number of Average number
operating plans plan-counties: of:
in a county demand data supply data eligibles payment rates premiums
0 5,386
1 497 1,860 13,583 527.6 59.4
2 456 1,167 32,183 536.9 40.8
3 339 635 47,116 582.2 40.8
4 184 367 58,611 574.7 38.5
5 130 180 65,552 579.3 46.7
6 84 146 130,593 598.3 29.4
7 21 40 234,969 700.6 12.8
8 24 41 157,267 760.3 0.7
9 36 56 261,881 725.2 ￿0.2
10 40 49 513,123 698.3 ￿1.2
Total 1,811 9,927 544.1 43.8
Table 5 explains the variables used in this study. After the names and de￿nitions of the
12variables in the ￿rst two columns, the next three columns indicate in which estimation of
demand, supply, or marginal cost a variable is used. Summary statistics follow.
4 Econometric Speci￿cations
4.1 The Demand
My demand model follows Town and Liu (2003) closely, using market share data with the
nested Logit model (Berry 1994￿ s approach) for welfare analysis. A Medicare bene￿ciary
chooses a Medicare plan every year by comparing the utility from each plan available in his
county and picking the plan with the highest utility. Utility is derived from health plan
characteristics such as premiums, bene￿ts, and so on. Here are some notations:
M : Year-markets (year-counties), m = 1;:::;M
J : Private Medicare plans, j = 1;:::;Jm
If j = 0, it means the traditional Medicare plan (the outside option).
Im : Medicare bene￿ciaries, i = 1;:::;Im:
Bene￿ciary i￿ s utility from plan j in year-market m is denoted as
uijm = w
0
jm￿ ￿ ￿pjm + ￿j + ￿MSA + ￿￿jm + "ijm (1)
￿ ￿jm + ￿￿jm + "ijm;
where wjm is a vector of observed plan characteristics, pjm is the premium, "ijm is a nested
Logit error, and ￿j + ￿MSA + ￿￿jm is a scalar contribution of the plan characteristics and
demand shocks unobserved by the econometrician. ￿jm is the mean utility. Without loss of
generality, the error term is normalized as E["ijm] = 0. Thus a bene￿ciary￿ s expected utility,
E[uim], increases with better bene￿ts, lower premiums, and more choices. To alleviate the
endogeneity problem discussed below, I apply ￿xed e⁄ects to plans and selected MSAs,
13Variable Name Definition D S MC Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
(i) Plan or plan-year level variables (the numbers of plan and plan-year observations: 207 and 403)
no experience =1 if a plan has no experience in Medicare before X X X 403 0.11 0.31 0 1
experience year Years in business since the first Medicare enrollee X X X 403 8.18 6.44 0 27
nonprofit Dummy variable: not-for-profit organizations X X 207 0.34 0.47 0 1
national chain Dummy variable: national chains X X 207 0.29 0.46 0 1
group model =1 if the plan is a group model HMO (The omitted category is ”network,
mixed, and other models”.)
X X 207 0.47 0.50 0 1
staff model =1 if the plan is a staff model HMO X X 207 0.07 0.25 0 1
IPA model =1 if the plan is an IPA model HMO X X 207 0.43 0.50 0 1
entire enrollees Total enrollees of the plan over its entire service areas (in 1,000) X 403 25,313 57,033 52 648,281
DEMO plan Dummy variable: DEMO plans X 207 0.15 0.36 0 1
cost plan Dummy variable: cost contract HMOs X 207 0.13 0.33 0 1
cost missing Dummy variable: cost contract HMOs with missing data X 207 0.05 0.22 0 1
PPO plan Dummy variable: PPO plans X 207 0.17 0.38 0 1
PFFS plan Dummy variable: PFFS plans X 207 0.02 0.15 0 1
PSO plan Dummy variable: PSO plans X 207 0.01 0.12 0 1
POS Dummy variable: HMOPOS X 207 0.03 0.17 0 1
(ii) Plan-county level variables (the number of plan-county-year observations: 3,289)
s jm Plan j’s market share in market m X 3,289 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.45
ln s j  | private, m ”Within-group share” in log X 3,289 -1.21 1.44 -7.55 0.00
monthly premium Monthly premium in $ (Medicare premium not included) X X 3,289 51.3 47.5 -62.6 189.0
# product in plan The number of products the plan offers in the market X X 3,289 2.16 1.28 1 10
benefit: drug Dummy variable: supplemental benefits in outpatient prescription drugs X 3,289 0.61 0.48 0 1
benefit: education Composite score: supplemental benefits in health education/welness X 3,289 0.36 0.27 0 0.9
benefit: physicals Composite score: supplemental benefits in routine physicals X 3,289 0.51 0.21 0 1
benefit: peripheral1 Composite score: supplemental benefits in preventive and comprehensive
dental, chiropractic, and acupuncture
X 3,289 0.10 0.18 0 1
benefit: peripheral2 Composite score: supplemental benefits in eye exams, eye wear,  hearing
exams, and hearing aids
X 3,289 0.48 0.29 0 1
benefit: screenings Composite score: supplemental benefits in screenings (mammography,
colorectal, prostate cancer, pap smears, and pelvic exams)
X 3,289 0.20 0.26 0 1
avg # competitor Average number of competitors in the other markets served by the plan IV 3,289 1.75 1.69 0 9
competitor: npo The number of competing NPO plans in the market IV 3,289 0.70 1.13 0 5
competitor: chain The number of competing national-chain plans in the market IV 3,289 0.71 1.08 0 5
competitor: IPA The number of competing IPA model plans IV 3,289 0.97 1.30 0 6
competitor: group The number of competing group model plans IV 3,289 0.74 0.99 0 4
competitor: staff The number of competing staff model plans IV 3,289 0.11 0.34 0 2
(iii) County or county-year level variables (the numbers of county and county-year observations: 948 and 1,767)
s 0m The market share of the traditional Medicare plan X 1,767 0.88 0.11 0.50 1.00
payment rate CMS monthly payment rate per enrollee for parts A and B X 1,767 527.5 80.5 296.7 1,067.5
FFS per capita cost Average fee-for-service monthly cost per enrollee 1,767 519.7 118.8 214.9 1,217.3
Std FFS per capita cost FFS per capita cost standardized by demographic factor X X 1,767 552.8 131.0 203.6 1,262.2
per capita # hospital The number of hospitals per 10,000 residents in 2001 IV X X 948 0.27 0.36 0.00 5.12
per capita # hospital bed The number of hospital beds per 1,000 residents in 2001 IV X X 948 3.18 4.58 0.00 87.50
per capita # medical doctor The number of general practice M.D.s per 1,000 residents  in 2001 IV X X 948 0.33 0.19 0.00 1.54
HMO penetration rate 98 Estimated (HMO enrollment / total population) in 1998 X X 948 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.96
eligibles Medicare eligibles (in 1,000) X 1,767 32,939 64,364 370 1,046,829
county: no hospital Dummy variable for counties with no hospital IV X X 1,767 0.16 0.36 0 1
MSA Dummy variable for counties in an MSA X 948 0.55 0.50 0 1
county: small County dummy: 3,000 < number of eligibles < 6,000 X 1,767 0.19 0.39 0 1
county: medium County dummy: 6,000 < number of eligibles < 15,000 X 1,767 0.28 0.45 0 1
county: large County dummy: 15,000 < number of eligibles < 50,000 X 1,767 0.25 0.44 0 1
county: extra large County dummy: 50,000 < number of eligibles < 150,000 X 1,767 0.14 0.35 0 1
county: huge County dummy: 150,000 < number of eligibles X 1,767 0.04 0.19 0 1
year: 2004 Year dummy variable for 2004 X X X 1,767 0.53 0.50 0 1
demo factor Demographic factors (e.g. age, sex, institutional status, and Medicaid
status) to adjust the payment rate (the higher, the more costly)
X 1,767 0.95 0.04 0.82 1.11
demo factor HMO Demographic factors for HMO enrollees X 1,767 0.93 0.09 0.73 1.66
risk factor HMO Risk factors  for HMO enrollee (e.g. disease group, community factors, and
institutional factors) to adjust the payment rate
X 1,767 0.86 0.12 0.52 1.53
medigap premium Monthly Medigap premium in $ X 1,767 137.4 38.4 70.1 231.8
hospital expenditure Total reported facility expenditures (short term general hospitals) (not
only Medicare)  per 1,000 residents  in $1,000 in the county
X 1,767 1.06 2.06 0.00 51.97
inpatient days Total Medicare inpatient days (short term hospitals) in 1,000 days X 1,767 67,939 157,012 0 2,351,152
”IV” means the variable used in the estimation as an instrument. For the summary statistics, Non-HMO observations are included. The ”hypothetical potentia
entrants” used in the supply estimation are not included. The six benefit variables from ”benefit: drug” to ”benefit: screenings” are the quality composite
Table 5: Definitions of Variables, Estimations Used (Demand, Supply, and Marginal Cost), and Summary Statistics
variables made by aggregating the detailed characteristics information in the PBP data set, based on the results of the factor analysis (Maruyama [2007]).
 14which are represented by ￿j + ￿MSA.10 Thus, ￿￿jm is the ￿rst-di⁄erenced demand shock. I
normalize the utility from the traditional Medicare plan as: ui0m = "i0m. This normalization
does not a⁄ect the welfare calculation, because consumer surplus in my study measures the
utility gain from enrolling in private Medicare plans relative to traditional Medicare.
Following previous studies, I assume a nested Logit error. The group structure is the
private plan group against the traditional Medicare plan. Thus, my assumption allows
substitution among private plans to di⁄er from substitution between private plans and the
traditional Medicare plan. The market share of plan j is derived as:

























The correlation within a group is possible through ￿. As ￿ goes to one, the within-group
correlation becomes one, and when ￿ = 0, this model is reduced to the multinomial Logit
model. When the market share data is used, this model can be estimated by transforming
to a linear form as follows (see Berry 1994):
(3) lnsjm ￿ lns0m = w
0
jm￿ ￿ ￿pjm + ￿j + ￿MSA + ￿ lnsjjprivate;m + ￿￿jm
for j = 1;:::;Jm: In estimation, I use the instrumental variable method to deal with the
potentially endogenous variables in (3) ￿ the monthly premium, pjm, and the within-group
10County ￿xed e⁄ect dummies are not used because many counties appear in the data set with only one
observation. By the same token, I apply MSA ￿xed e⁄ects only to MSAs with at least ten observations.
15share, ln(sjjprivate;m); these two variables may be correlated with the plan demand shock,
￿￿jm. As I use the ￿xed-e⁄ect approach, the identi￿cation of parameters comes from within-
plan and within-MSA changes in the instruments.
I construct instruments using three strategies. The ￿rst set of instruments is the per
resident numbers of hospitals, hospital beds, and general practice medical doctors, and a
county dummy variable for counties with no hospital. These variables are valid instruments
because they a⁄ect the plans￿relative bargaining power with providers, and thus their cost
structure and the number of competitors. Second, I use the characteristics of competing
plans in a county. This approach is traditional in the literature on product-di⁄erentiated
market demand (e.g. Bresnahan 1987, Berry 1994).11 This is valid if competitors￿entry-
exit decisions and changes in product characteristics are uncorrelated with changes in ￿￿jm.
Speci￿cally, I choose indicator variables for not-for-pro￿t ownership, chain a¢ liation, and
HMO network types (IPA, Group, and Sta⁄ models), as instruments, which are supposed
to be relatively ￿xed and predetermined. Third, I use the average number of competitors
in the other markets in which the plan operates. This use of the panel structure of data
is a strategy similar to that of Hausman (1997) and Nevo (2001). Private Medicare plans
typically set premiums not for individual counties but for each product, so the plan premium
in a county is likely to be correlated with the competitive environment in the plan￿ s other
service counties. ￿￿jm is speci￿c to the market, so it is likely to be uncorrelated with this
instrument.12 In the end, I have ten instruments for two endogenous variables. The ￿rst
stage regression is reported in Appendix A. For both pjm and ln(sjjprivate;m), the F-statistics
reject the joint hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on the instruments are all zero.
11Dafny and Dranove (2005) also use this approach in the demand estimation of Medicare HMOs.
12The argument here does not contradict with the assumption that each plan chooses its premiums at
the county level. Since a product must have the same premium in all the counties it covers, a plan sets its
(average) premium in each county by setting up additional products and/or adjusting the service areas each
product covers. To the extent that an additional product requires some set-up costs and the county-level
pro￿t-maximization assumption holds only as an approximation, the Hausman type instrument is valid.
164.2 HMO￿ s Behavioral Model
4.2.1 The Game Speci￿cation
In each market, there are Jpot
m potentially operating HMO plans. Each county can accom-
modate zero, one, or more than one HMO plan. At the beginning of each year, all the
potential entrants in each market play the following game. The game consists of two parts, a
sequential move entry game and a simultaneous-move price setting game. Only HMOs that
choose "enter" play the price setting game. If a plan chooses "not enter", it receives zero
pro￿t from the county. The plan characteristics are exogenously ￿xed in this study.
The game is assumed to be a public information game, because private information mod-
els with publicly observable heterogeneity are relatively di¢ cult to be estimated. The number
of potential entrants, plan characteristics, random shocks in pro￿ts, and other information
are all commonly known by all players. The only information unknown to all the plans when
they make decisions is the random shock in the demand, ￿￿jm. This technical assumption
is necessary to keep the estimation consistent and well-behaved, because the values of ￿￿jm
cannot be obtained for the hypothetical entrants. This assumption is not unrealistic as long
as the ￿xed e⁄ects capture some of the plan characteristics observed by the plan but not the
econometrician and there exist demand shocks HMOs cannot predict ex ante.
I employ a sequential move entry game. This guarantees the existence of a unique sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium, even for large asymmetric games.13 In the sequential game,
I assume the decision order as follows. Among all the potential entrants in a market, the
incumbents move ￿rst. Incumbents make decisions in the order of the following incumbency
13There is no guarantee that this assumption will be realistic, but a simultaneous game is no less a priori
than a sequential game. Mazzeo (2002) estimates his model under several game structure assumptions.
Einav (2003) endogenizes the order of decisions. These papers suggest that di⁄erences from employing
di⁄erent game settings are relatively small. For simultaneous move games of complete information, there
have been recent developments of the estimation method, such as Bajari et al. (2007), while the estimation
of a sequential move game has not been well studied.
17classes: (1) previous year presence in the county, (2) previous year presence in the same
MSA, and (3) previous year presence in the same state. Within the same incumbency class,
HMOs make decisions in the order of their entire enrollment size. If larger incumbents have
to announce their service area changes earlier, this assumption is more likely.
I use the subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium (SPNE) concept. An SPNE in
a county is obtained when: (1) all entering ￿rms are pro￿table with their optimized prices,
and (2) all ￿rms that do not enter expect non-positive pro￿ts from entry. Each HMO￿ s
entry-exit strategy in county m is represented by a binary variable, yjm, which takes "0" if
plan j does not enter and "1" if enters. A market con￿guration is denoted as ym, which is a
vector that stacks (y1m;:::;yJmm) and the equilibrium solution, y￿
m, can be calculated by the
backward induction algorithm.
4.2.2 The Pro￿t Function
I assume the pro￿t to be additively separable across counties, so each plan￿ s pro￿t maximizing
decisions can be reduced to a county level optimization problem. I assume the following local
pro￿t function for plan j in county m:
￿jm(x￿m;zjm;"jm;ym;￿) = [pjm(x￿m;ym) + Payment Ratem ￿ MCjm] (4)
￿qjm (p￿m(x￿m;ym);x￿m;ym) + zjm￿ + "jm
￿ V Pjm(x￿m;ym) + zjm￿ + "jm,
where the square bracket part is marginal pro￿ts and qjm() is the demand. p￿m is (p1m;:::;pJmm)0,
x￿m is (x1m;:::;xJmm)0, xjm is the set of predetermined observables and ￿xed e⁄ects in the de-
mand function, namely (wjm;￿j;￿MSA), and payment rate means the government per enrollee
payment rate. zjm is the independent variables that explain the ￿xed part of the pro￿ts, ￿ is
a parameter vector to be estimated, and "jm is idiosyncratic shocks to plan j in market m,
18observed by all the ￿rms ex-ante, but unobserved by the econometrician.14 V Pjm() denotes
variable pro￿ts. HMOs are assumed to incur ￿xed costs at the county level, which is the sum
of the last two terms. For the explanatory variables, zjm, I choose market-speci￿c variables
and relatively exogenous or predetermined plan-speci￿c variables, such as non-pro￿t status,
chain a¢ liation, and years of experience. I exclude variables that are likely to be correlated
with "jm, such as bene￿t coverages, regarding this speci￿cation as a reduced form.
Before estimating the entry model, I estimate marginal costs. The estimation of marginal
costs for the ￿rms that actually enter relies on the ￿rst order condition of the price-setting
game. The ￿rst order condition in market m can be written as




for j = 1;:::;Jenter
m , where Jenter
m is the number of actual entrants in county m. This equation
can be solved for MCjm by writing15









1 ￿ ￿sjjprivate;m ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)sjm
￿:
To calculate MCjm by using (6), I use ￿tted shares for sjm and sjjprivate;m, instead of observed
shares, under the assumption that ￿￿jm is unknown to plans when they make decisions.16
For hypothetical entrants, the lack of observed pjm and sjm requires MCjm to be ex-
14I also implicitly assume the additive separability across plans for an organization. Some HMOs o⁄er
more than one plan in an area, but incorporating the economies of scale and scope is beyond the scope of this
article. Likewise, the strategic dynamic optimization is beyond the static approach of this article. Market
speci￿c error terms and ￿xed e⁄ects I use may alleviate the biases from these issues.
15While plans can charge "negative" premiums in the form of a Medicare premium rebate since 2003, only
0.5% of the plan-county observations charge negative premiums in my data and 30.0% charge zero premiums.
This mass point at zero premiums may re￿ ect administrative costs of charging non-zero premiums. As long
as this censoring occurs symmetrically around zero, the bias is considered to be modest, if any.
16Including ￿￿jm changes the mean of MCjm by just 0:2%, so the potential bias of this behavioral
assumption is negligible.
19trapolated. I obtain MCjm by a reduced-form linear OLS regression, in which I choose
independent variables that are likely to be exogenous or predetermined, such as non-pro￿t
status, chain a¢ liation, and market characteristics variables, as listed in Table 5. The result
is reported in Appendix A.
4.3 The Estimation Algorithm
I specify the components unobserved to the econometrician as







where Im is the market size and !;￿; and ￿ are parameters to be estimated. ￿jm and ￿m are
distributed i.i.d. standard normal across plans and markets and assumed to be independent
of z￿m. The correlation of the unobservable "jm across plans in a given market is then ￿2.
As the market size varies signi￿cantly, ￿ and Im are used to control the variance of the error
term.
I employ the maximum likelihood estimation. Denote the observed market con￿guration
as yo
m. The maximum likelihood problem can be written as














where ￿ is the vector of model parameters, (￿;!;￿;￿), and y￿
m is the predicted market
con￿guration given (x￿m;z￿m;￿;"jm) that can be solved uniquely by backward induction.
The probability in the likelihood, however, does not have an analytical form solution
due to multidimensional integrals, so I use the maximum simulated likelihood method. To
make the estimation of the large game computationally feasible, I propose a modi￿cation of
the GHK (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) simulator, one of the smooth recursive conditioning
20simulators, in the maximum simulated likelihood method.17 This simulator provides a dif-
ferentiable, unbiased estimator of likelihood with smaller variance than the crude frequency
simulator. The original GHK simulator allows interactions across j through the disturbance
structure, but not strategic interactions across j. In Appendix B, I modify the simulator to
￿t my model, by claiming the simulator can be harmonized with sequential move games by
exploiting its recursive conditioning structure.
To solve the game and obtain y￿
m in each likelihood evaluation, the (partial) equilibrium
prices and quantities, p￿m and q￿m, need to be available for any market con￿guration, ym,
to determine the payo⁄s. First I calculate p￿m by solving the system of the ￿rst order
conditions in the price-setting game, (5). Given the estimated demand parameters, (￿;￿;￿),
and the values of MC￿m;x￿m, Payment Ratem, and ym, there are Jenter
m equations and Jenter
m
unknowns. Due to the numerical feature of the discrete choice model, however, the price
function, pjm(x￿m;ym), does not have a closed form solution. I solve the equation system for
pjm by the following numerical algorithm. The ￿rst order condition, (5), can be written as:




￿1 ￿ Payment Ratem + MCjm;
for j = 1;:::;Jenter














￿1 ￿ Payment Ratem + MCjm;
for j = 1;:::;Jenter
m and t = 0;1;2;:::. For the initial values of pt
jm, the observed values of
pjm are used. It turns out that this numerical iteration converges in an acceptable amount
of time.18 After p￿m is calculated, I can use the estimated demand equation to calculate q￿m.
17For a starting point for the GHK simulator and related methods, see Contoyannis, et al. (2004).
18The demand shock, ￿￿jm, is consistently excluded from all of these calculations. If I use MCjm calcu-
lated with ￿￿jm, the performance of this numerical iteration is sometimes poor.
214.4 Welfare Measures and Simulations
The net welfare gain of having private plans in Medicare is given by
￿W = (CSw=PrivatePlans ￿ CSw=oPrivatePlans) ￿ (10)
(Gw=PrivatePlans ￿ Gw=oPrivatePlans) + private plan pro￿ts;
where CSx denotes the aggregated consumer surplus attributable to program x, and Gx
denotes government expenditures. I use HMO pro￿ts instead of the pro￿ts of all private
plans, as discussed above. Following McFadden (1981), annual expected consumer surplus
can be derived as:












b ￿jm + ￿￿jm
1 ￿ b ￿
!3
5:
The wealth e⁄ect is assumed to be zero. In the data set, all the premiums and payment rates
are de￿ned on a monthly basis, so the calculated surplus is multiplied by twelve.
Counterfactual simulations use the same framework as above. The only di⁄erence is that
I exclude ￿￿jm from all calculations in the simulations, because ￿￿jm can be calculated only
for observed entrants. Due to the convexity of the function in the square bracket in (11),
consumer surplus is understated without ￿￿jm. By the same token, the predicted number of
HMO enrollees, government gain, and HMO pro￿ts, are also understated. In the simulations,
we should focus on the change in numbers, not the level.
Not only bene￿ciaries and suppliers but also the government may enjoy the welfare gain
from the program. This gain comes from per-enrollee cost di⁄erence between per-enrollee
payments to private plans and expected per capita costs in the traditional Medicare plan that
22the government would have to pay without private Medicare plans. Thus if the government
payment rate is lower than the expected fee-for-service cost in a county, the government
expect more gain from more members transferring from traditional Medicare to Medicare
HMOs. I calculate Gw=oPrivatePlans by using demographic data and average fee-for-service
cost of traditional Medicare. I discount the average cost data by 8.0% to take into account
favorable selection, a widely acknowledged phenomenon that Medicare bene￿ciaries who
choose to join an HMO are systematically healthier than bene￿ciaries who choose to remain
in the same fee-for-service sector even after adjusting for the demographic characteristics
included in Medicare￿ s HMO payment methodology (e.g. Mello, et al. 2003). GAO (2000)
concludes Medicare HMO enrollees are 11.7% less costly than the other Medicare eligibles
on average. I use 8.0% instead, because (1) the Medicare HMO market is shrinking since
GAO (2000)￿ s data years, while the main source of the cost di⁄erence is new HMO joiners,
(2) the cost di⁄erence for new enrollees is also gets smaller over years (GAO 2000), and (3)
after 1998, the government has gradually introduced a new payment methodology with more
detailed risk adjustments. If 8.0% is misspeci￿ed by, for example, 1%, the net social welfare




Table 6 shows the results of the demand estimation. The signi￿cant coe¢ cient on lnsjjprivate;m
implies that the imposed grouping structure is relevant. The results indicate that consumers
are attracted by plans with lower premiums, more bene￿ts (except for education bene-
￿ts), more options ("# products in plan"), and longer experience of business in Medicare.
23Table 6: Nested Logit Demand with Fixed E⁄ects
Dependent variable: Nested Logit
ln(sjm) ￿ ln(s0m) without IV with IV
ln sjjprivate;m 0.639 (.014) 0.348 (.055)
monthly premium ￿0.0022 (.0008) ￿0.0105 (.0057)
bene￿t: drug 0.203 (.062) 0.338 (.182)
bene￿t: education ￿0.139 (.150) ￿0.296 (.182)
bene￿t: physicals 0.457 (.149) 0.419 (.167)
bene￿t: peripheral1 0.351 (.195) 0.551 (.236)
bene￿t: peripheral2 0.069 (.113) 0.096 (.124)
bene￿t: screenings 0.370 (.196) 0.517 (.232)
# products in plan 0.112 (.021) 0.163 (.027)
no experience ￿0.364 (.077) ￿0.389 (.107)
ln experience year 0.720 (.195) 0.794 (.236)
HMO penet rate 98 1.802 (.137) 1.255 (.194)
year: 2004 0.118 (.040) ￿0.253 (.075)
constant ￿4.277 (.288) ￿4.955 (.411)
Adjusted R2 0.831 0.797
The number of observations: 3,289. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Medicare HMOs have more popularity in the counties where HMOs are more common in
the commercial sector. Table 7 reports price elasticities, marginal costs, and per-capita
consumer surplus. The conventional price elasticity is not de￿ned, because charging a non-
positive premium is a common practice. Table 7 shows two alternative measures of price
sensitivity ￿ the semi-elasticity, ￿jm ￿ (@sjm=@pjm) ￿ (1=sjm) and the price elasticity from
producers￿point of view, ￿jm￿(pjm + Payment Ratem).19 The latter elasticity is well-de￿ned
because premiums are much smaller than payment rates. With values less than ￿1:0, the
estimated elasticity does not contradict with the pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm assumption. The
table also shows that the elderly people in counties with at least one Medicare HMO are
enjoying about monthly $50 consumer surplus on average, regardless of whether he joins a
private plan or the traditional Medicare plan. As discussed in the model section, I calculate
these values in two ways, depending on whether I include ￿￿jm or not, i.e. whether I use
19If the semi-elasticity is ￿0.02, a $1 increase in the premium is expected to reduce the enrollment by 2%.
24observed market share or ￿tted market share. When ￿￿jm is in the calculation, the obtained
values will be closer to the reality, but the values calculated without ￿￿jm are necessary for
the counterfactual simulations. The table shows that this does not make a di⁄erence in the
estimated elasticities, but does a⁄ect consumer surplus.
Table 7: Price Semi-Elasticity, Marginal Costs, and Consumer Surplus
# obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Own-price semi-elasticity (in 100%)
with ￿￿jm 3,289 ￿0.0124 0.0026 ￿0.0161 ￿0.0058
w/o ￿￿jm 3,289 ￿0.0124 0.0026 ￿0.0161 ￿0.0075
Own-price elasticity for private plans (in %)
with ￿￿jm 3,289 ￿7.529 2.246 ￿17.452 ￿2.841
w/o ￿￿jm 3,289 ￿7.575 2.167 ￿16.583 ￿2.952
Marginal costs (monthly in $)
w/o ￿￿jm 3,289 517.6 103.0 196.2 1146.3
Consumer surplus (per capita, monthly in $)
with ￿￿jm 1,767 53.2 80.3 0.02 512.8
w/o ￿￿jm 1,767 41.1 64.4 0.09 396.3
Table 8 shows the results of the entry estimation. The estimated coe¢ cients represent
each variable￿ s contribution to ￿xed pro￿ts. The result suggests that a newcomer in Medicare
incurs signi￿cant setup costs in each county, but the length of business in Medicare is irrele-
vant. The result that for-pro￿t and chain plans face higher ￿xed costs seems not straightfor-
ward. What is explained by this model is not the accounting pro￿ts but the economic pro￿ts
that lead a plan to entry decision. If for-pro￿t chain plans have a tendency to re-optimize
their market area more frequently than nonpro￿t local chains, it may explain these results.
The negative coe¢ cient on standardized per capita fee-for-service costs indicates that a plan
incurs additional ￿xed costs and/or is reluctant to operate in a county where utilization of
medical care is relatively high. Per capita medical care infrastructure variables are included
to control the costs of organizing and maintaining the provider network. The results indicate
a plan incurs the highest cost when there is only one hospital in the county, the case where
25the plan￿ s bargaining power is weakest. The larger the county is, the higher ￿xed costs a plan
incurs. On the other hand, being in an MSA is favorable to HMO plans, probably because
health providers￿bargaining power is weaker compared to isolated cities, or maybe because
the coe¢ cient captures some economy of scale, which is beyond the scope of my supply side
model. The estimated parameters, ! and ￿, indicate that plan-county-speci￿c shocks, ￿jm,
account for 60% of the variance of ￿xed cost errors and county-speci￿c shocks, ￿m, for 40%.
The signi￿cantly estimated value of ￿ rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
Table 8: Entry Estimation
Dependent variable: County level ￿xed pro￿ts in $1,000,000
no experience ￿1.252 (.250)
experience year 0.006 (.006)
nonpro￿t 0.159 (.044)
national chain ￿0.505 (.067)
group model 0.568 (.088)
IPA model 0.166 (.099)
sta⁄ model 0.069 (.126)
Std FFS per capita cost ￿0.002 (.0002)
per capita # hospital 0.228 (.035)
per capita # hospital bed 0.001 (.004)
per capita # medical doctor 0.114 (.062)
county: no hospital 0.937 (.080)
MSA 0.321 (.079)
county: small ￿0.554 (.070)
county: medium ￿1.462 (.096)
county: large ￿4.430 (.218)
county: extra large ￿7.334 (.771)
county: huge ￿12.124 (4.85)
year: 2004 0.091 (.031)
constant ￿1.158 (.076)
! (plan-county-speci￿c error) 0.267 (.024)
￿ (county-speci￿c error) 0.216 (.018)
￿ (heteroskedasticity) 0.859 (.019)
The number of markets: 5,075. The number of potential entrants: 19,544.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of simulation draws: 40.
265.2 Welfare Analysis and Simulations
Table 9 summarizes the calculated net social welfare gain of the Medicare HMO program.
Adding the above three welfare components results in the net welfare gain, 9.04 billion dollars
in 2003 and 10.27 billion in 2004. The majority of the gain comes from producer surplus,
while the government is losing money.20
Table 9: Welfare Results
2003 2004 2000 (Town&Liu)
Consumer surplus 2,806 2,862 4,061
(1,362) (1,366)
HMO pro￿ts 7,751 8,027 8,757
(210) (243)
Net government gain ￿1,119 ￿371 N/A
CMS payment to private plans
34,147 37,825 41,726
Expected FFS payment without private plans
33,028 37,454 N/A
Net social welfare gain 9,044 10,267 N/A
Consumer surplus w/o ￿￿jm 2,262 2,476
HMO pro￿ts w/o ￿￿jm 7,357 7,777
Net government gain w/o ￿￿jm ￿1,133 ￿307
Net social welfare gain w/o ￿￿jm 8,486 9,947
Annual, in millions of dollars. Standard errors shown in parentheses are
calculated by Monte Carlo simulation over simulation draws and parameters.
My estimates are all smaller than the 2000 numbers by Town and Liu (2003) shown in the
last column. A drastic decrease in the number of participating HMOs and enrollees between
these years may explain the di⁄erences. The decrease in producer surplus is smaller than
the decreases in the others, possibly because the actual payments had gradually increased
on average since 1998 (GAO 2000). Overstatement of producer surplus may be another ex-
20The table also shows the numbers calculated without ￿￿jm. Whether I use ￿tted market share or
predicted market share a⁄ects HMO pro￿ts and government gain as well through a change in enrollment.
27planation. While ￿rms make their entry decision considering their long-run payo⁄, my entry
model, as well as Town and Liu￿ s, assumes ￿rms only consider current year payo⁄s. Under
a certain stationarity assumption of the market, this simpli￿cation should be ￿ne, but, after
huge exodus of HMOs around 2001, it is likely remaining ￿rms are systematically optimistic
for their future pro￿ts, which leads to upward bias of current-year producer surplus. The
assumption of additive separability across counties might also be a source of bias.
In the following, I perform counterfactual simulations to demonstrate the potential of
endogenizing the entry-exit decisions of ￿rms. The structural estimation strategy combined
with welfare analysis and full ￿rm heterogeneity enables the following various counterfactual
simulations. Some biases may arise from the fact I endogenize the entry-exit decision but
not the decision on plan characteristics, so the result numbers have limitations and should
be carefully interpreted for policy suggestions.
Payment Rate Simulations I perform welfare simulations with four di⁄erent payment
rates. In the simulations, a change of the payment rate ￿rst a⁄ects the cost structure of
HMOs, and then they re-optimize their entry-exit and price decisions by taking the demand
and the rivals￿response into consideration, which leads to a new equilibrium. Based on the
recalculated market shares, the welfare components are recalculated.
Tables 10 and 11 show the results with four di⁄erent payment rates in 2003 and 2004,
respectively. Uniformly raising the payment rate by 25 or 50 dollars leads to a decrease in
the average premium and increases in the enrollment and entrants. In turn, this increases
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and the government de￿cit. Among the ￿ve di⁄erent
payment rates, the maximum social welfare gain is achieved with +$25 in both years. Table
12 shows where new HMO entry occurs when the payment rate is raised by 50 dollars in
2004. While entry is observed in all county types, its probability is lower in more concentrated
counties.
28Table 10: Payment Rate Simulation: 2003
Payment rate: ￿$50 ￿$25 ￿$0 +$25 +$50
Consumer surplus 1,038 1,518 2,262 3,610 5,247
HMO pro￿ts 6,160 6,698 7,357 8,148 9,186
Net government gain 1,000 181 ￿1,133 ￿3,204 ￿6,172
CMS payment to HMO 17,719 23,203 30,626 41,965 54,211
Expected FFS payment 18,719 23,385 29,493 38,761 48,039
Net social welfare gain 8,198 8,397 8,486 8,555 8,261
Enrollment (total) 2,786,815 3,488,045 4,417,637 5,760,803 7,167,725
Enrollment (HMO) 2,323,225 3,058,945 4,028,858 5,410,492 6,854,673
# of plan-mkt (total) 1,320 1,387 1,478 1,564 1,662
# of plan-mkt (HMO) 839 906 997 1,083 1,181
Avg premium (HMO) 97.71 73.43 49.23 27.35 5.76
All welfare measures are in millions of dollars, calculated without ￿￿jm.
Decomposing Welfare Changes Further counterfactual simulations give another insight
into how payment rate changes a⁄ect social welfare. I decompose net social welfare changes
into three components: entry e⁄ect, market power e⁄ect, and subsidy e⁄ect. Entry e⁄ect,
the welfare impact through HMOs￿entry-exit response, can be con￿rmed by turning the
entry-exit response on and o⁄ in a payment simulation. HMOs￿market power might be
a possible source of social ine¢ ciency. To clarify this point, the average premium changes
when the payment rate is raised by 50 dollars are shown in Table 13 by the type of county.
The second column shows the results without entry, and the third column shows the results
with simulated entry. Each plan sets its premium according to the ￿rst order condition, (6),
depending on its market power. The result shows that, while monopolists "bank" about
10% of the payment rate change through increased price-cost margins, when there are nine
entrants, most of the payment rate increase goes to consumers through premium reduction.21
21Concerning pass-through behavior of a ￿rm with a cost advantage, see Besanko, et al. (2001).
29Table 11: Payment Rate Simulation: 2004
Payment rate: ￿$50 ￿$25 ￿$0 +$25 +$50
Consumer surplus 1,143 1,671 2,476 3,589 5,121
HMO pro￿ts 6,492 7,067 7,777 8,689 9,786
Net government gain 1,695 950 ￿307 ￿2,237 ￿5,022
CMS payments 20,777 27,064 35,401 45,817 58,388
Expected FFS payment 22,472 28,013 35,094 43,581 53,366
Net social welfare gain 9,330 9,688 9,947 10,041 9,885
Enrollment (total) 3,054,761 3,813,610 4,795,493 5,952,749 7,304,955
Enrollment (HMO) 2,457,181 3,270,073 4,309,146 5,516,147 6,918,159
# of plan-mkt (total) 1,637 1,712 1,811 1,895 1,990
# of plan-mkt (HMO) 920 995 1,094 1,178 1,273
Avg premium (HMO) 84.97 60.61 36.50 14.59 ￿6.99
All welfare measures are in millions of dollars, calculated without ￿￿jm:
The last column of the table shows the average payment rate changes by incumbents that
face new entrants. The more concentrated the market is, the larger premium reduction the
market experiences from entry.
Subsidizing too much is another possible source of potential dead weight loss, as the
per-enrollee payment from the government to HMOs can be seen as price subsidy. After
the welfare impact of entry is quanti￿ed, I decompose the residual into market power e⁄ect
and subsidy e⁄ect, by using the following experimental simulation: (1) there is no additional
entry and (2) each ￿rm passes all the incremental payment along to its enrollees through
premium reduction.2223
The results of the decomposition are shown in Table 14. The second column shows the
22I do not assume HMO￿ s price cost margins are zero; I assume there is no room for them to exploit their
market power for the $50 payment rate increase.
23In this decomposition, cross term e⁄ects are included in entry e⁄ect, that is, entry e⁄ect here includes
not only pure entry e⁄ect but also market power and subsidy e⁄ect for new entrants. In any case, the
di⁄erence in the results is negligibly small.
30Table 12: Where New Entry Occurs when Payment Rate Raised by $50: 2004
Initial number of HMO Number of Number of Ratio
plans in a county markets entry occurrence
0 1918 110.2 5.7%
1 362 34.9 9.6%
2 181 19.1 10.5%
3 49 7.5 15.2%
4 27 3.0 10.9%
5 3 0.5 17.7%
6 2 0.6 28.5%
7 3 1.3 42.3%
8 5 1.6 31.4%
9 3 0.4 13.3%
Total 2,553 178.9 7.0%
Average over simulation draws. Non-HMO plans are not included.
Table 13: Average Incumbent Premium Changes when Payments Raised by $50: 2004
Initial number of HMO Average over all plans Average over plans
plans in a county w/o entry with entry facing new entry
1 ￿44.12 ￿46.37 ￿69.92
2 ￿46.80 ￿47.64 ￿55.45
3 ￿47.53 ￿48.20 ￿52.39
4 ￿48.15 ￿48.40 ￿51.06
5 ￿48.11 ￿48.64 ￿50.53
6 ￿48.94 ￿49.61 ￿51.67
7 ￿49.11 ￿49.78 ￿52.22
8 ￿49.23 ￿49.74 ￿51.30
9 ￿49.26 ￿49.41 ￿50.47
Average over plans and simulation draws.
31Table 14: Welfare Change Decomposition: 2004
Total Subsidy Market Entry
e⁄ect e⁄ect power e⁄ect
2004 Total welfare +90:1 +132:7 ￿13:0 ￿25:5
+$25 Cons surplus +1;112:4 +949:9 ￿85:6 +248:1
Prod surplus +911:8 +954:0 +27:0 ￿69:2
Gov savings ￿1;930:1 ￿1;771:3 +45:5 ￿204:4
Enrollment +1;207;001 +942;134 ￿81;704 +346;571
Premium ￿21:91 ￿25:00 +1:69 +1:32
2004 Total welfare ￿61:6 +77:5 +8:6 ￿147:6
+$50 Cons surplus +2;644:5 +2;223:6 ￿233:5 +654:4
Prod surplus +2;009:1 +2;031:6 +78:2 ￿100:8
Gov savings ￿4;715:2 ￿4;177:8 +163:8 ￿701:2
Enrollment +2;609;013 +2;004;772 ￿191;360 +795;601
Premium ￿43:49 ￿50:00 +3:62 +2:81
All welfare ￿gures are in millions of dollars.
net welfare changes from the payment rate increase. The remaining three columns show the
three e⁄ects, which sum up to the total e⁄ect. For both +$25 and +$50 cases, subsidy and
entry e⁄ects signi￿cantly increase consumer surplus by lowering premiums and providing
more choices. The market power e⁄ect is relatively small.24 The net welfare impacts of these
three e⁄ects are di⁄erent between the two cases. The subsidy e⁄ect is positive in both cases,
but larger in the $25 case. On the contrary, the entry e⁄ect is negative in both cases, but
larger in the $50 case. As a result, increasing payment rates by 25 dollars has a positive
net welfare impact because of the large subsidy e⁄ect, while increasing payment rates by
50 dollars has a negative net welfare impact because the negative entry e⁄ect dominates.
Beyond this level of payment rates, per enrollee government spending is huge and entry of
HMOs harms social welfare.
24The reason the market power e⁄ect on government gain is positive is that, at this level of payment rates,
it is bene￿cial for the government to have fewer HMO enrollees even if it is due to HMOs￿price-cost margins.
For the same reason, entry e⁄ect increases government de￿cits. The entry e⁄ect on premiums is positive
because some entry occurs in counties without incumbents, which results in high, monopoly premiums.
32Simulating Entry Is the entry level excessive? To answer this question, I perform entry
simulations. Changing the level of entry is not straightforward because the simulation result
may depend on which plan to be included. To choose which plan I use the results in the
previous payment simulations, by employing four market con￿gurations that result from
four di⁄erent payment levels. For example, increasing payment rates by 25 dollars in 2004
results in 84 more entrants, which I add to the actual observations and recalculate welfare
components without changing payment rates.
Tables 15 and 16 show the results for 2003 and 2004, respectively. In general, additional
entry increases HMO enrollment and consumer surplus but harms HMO pro￿ts and the
government budget. In 2003, 86 more entrants lead to a higher social welfare gain. Additional
consumer surplus brought by new entry exceeds other negative impacts. In 2004, the actual
entry level is likely to be close to the optimum. Thus, the result shows no evidence of
excessive entry. At the current level of entry, the consumer e¢ ciency gain from having more
entrants matches or maybe even outweighs the social ine¢ ciency from duplicative set-up
costs of ￿rms. Also, though net social welfare is not quite responsive to the level of entry,
the implied changes in welfare distribution from entry is signi￿cant.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I develop an econometric model to examine welfare consequences of policy
change through entry, with a case study of the US Medicare HMO market. The explicit
treatment of ￿rm heterogeneity is the technical breakthrough of this paper. It enables us to
exploit detailed ￿rm level data and makes policy simulations relevant, which is beyond the
scope of previous studies. As the main result of the research, I ￿nd no evidence of excessive
entry in terms of social welfare, which suggests that the government should keep at least
this level of entry. Also, the government may achieve higher social welfare by expanding the
33Table 15: Entry Simulation: 2003
HMO entry: ￿158 ￿91 ￿0 +86 +184
Consumer surplus 1,912 2,064 2,262 2,682 2,933
HMO pro￿ts 7,411 7,422 7,357 7,120 6,818
Net government gain ￿992 ￿1,016 ￿1,133 ￿1,262 ￿1,377
CMS payments 27,178 28,679 30,626 34,385 36,819
Expected FFS payment 26,255 27,664 29,493 33,123 35,442
Net social welfare gain 8,400 8,470 8,486 8,540 8,373
Enrollment (HMO) 3,480,377 3,717,962 4,028,858 5,077,263 4,905,955
# of plan-mkt (HMO) 839 906 997 1,083 1,181
Avg premium (HMO) 50.23 49.81 49.23 50.70 52.14
All welfare measures are in millions of dollars, calculated without ￿￿jm:
program.
While endogenizing the entry-exit decision, I model product characteristics as exogenous
components. This is a limitation of my model, especially when product choice is an impor-
tant and readily adjustable strategic variable for ￿rms and the choice a⁄ects social welfare
signi￿cantly. The literature has never achieved combining welfare analysis with both entry
and product choice decisions, but incorporating another discrete decision variable, such as
the drug bene￿t availability, is a simple extension of my framework, at least conceptually,
and seems a promising direction of the future study.
Appendix
A.1 Additional Tables
Table 17 shows the results of the ￿rst stage regression in the demand estimation. Overall,
the instruments have reasonable coe¢ cients and signi￿cances. Table 18 shows the results of
34Table 16: Entry Simulation: 2004
HMO entry: ￿174 ￿99 ￿0 +84 +179
Consumer surplus 2,074 2,260 2,476 2,657 2,830
HMO pro￿ts 7,836 7,850 7,777 7,643 7,410
Net government gain ￿138 ￿209 ￿307 ￿394 ￿478
CMS payments 31,297 33,198 35,401 37,569 39,617
Expected FFS payment 31,158 32,990 35,094 37,175 39,139
Net social welfare gain 9,772 9,901 9,947 9,906 9,762
Enrollment (HMO) 3,695,149 3,979,549 4,309,146 4,603,436 4,890,993
# of plan-mkt (HMO) 920 995 1,094 1,178 1,273
Avg premium (HMO) 37.72 37.08 36.50 37.89 39.37
All welfare measures are in millions of dollars, calculated without ￿￿jm:
the OLS regression for marginal costs. Since this estimation is reduced-form and simply for
the extrapolation purpose, the estimated coe¢ cients should be read as such.
A.2 Applying the GHK Simulator
In this appendix, I follow the customary notation and change the subscript for a market from
m to i = 1;:::;N, as each market is the unit for which the individual likelihood is de￿ned.
For a vector of indices (1;:::;J), the notation "< j" denotes the subvector (1;:::;j￿1), "￿ j"
denotes the subvector (1;:::;j), and "￿j" denotes the subvector that excludes component j.
In the sequential move game, the order of subscripts for ￿rms (1;2;:::;Ji) comprises the
reverse of the decision order in market i ￿ ￿rm Ji makes a decision ￿rst, ￿rm 1 makes a
decision last, and so on. Firm j￿ s strategy in market i is represented by yj;i; a binary variable
that takes "1" if the ￿rm enters and "0" otherwise. To make the notation simple, I omit the
di⁄erence between the independent variables in the demand and the ￿xed pro￿ts, xjm and
zjm, and let Xji denote the set of independent variables. The pro￿ts of entering ￿rm j in
35Table 17: The First Stage IV Regression
Dependent variable: ln sjjprivate;m premium
avg # competitor ￿0.063 ￿0.446
(.068) (1.189)
competitor: npo ￿0.207 *** ￿5.404 ***
(.056) (1.03)
competitor: chain 0.022 ￿6.423 ***
(.057) (1.18)
competitor: IPA ￿0.547 *** 0.989
(.058) (1.03)
competitor: group ￿0.269 *** 0.110
(.033) (.601)
competitor: sta⁄ ￿0.596 *** 3.127
(.118) (1.98)
per capita # hospital 2.067 *** 2.783
(.617) (10.56)
per capita # hospital bed ￿0.003 ￿0.007
(.004) (.072)
county: no hospital 0.012 ￿0.305
(.042) (.841)
per capita # medical doctor ￿0.156 * 0.825
(.094) (1.50)
R2 0.770 0.921
F-test (distributed F(10;2;987)) 43.98 *** 7.68 ***
The number of observations: 3,289. *, **, and *** denote p<.1, p<.05, and p<.01,
respectively. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are used. Other
independent variables and ￿xed e⁄ects are used but not reported.
market i are:
(12) ￿ji(X￿i;"ji;y￿j;i;￿) ￿ V P(yi;X￿i) + Xji￿ + "ji:
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is obtained when (1) all entering ￿rms are
pro￿table with their optimal prices and (2) all ￿rms that do not enter expect non-positive
36Table 18: Marginal Cost Regression
Dependent variable: MCjm
(out-of-pocket cost ￿ premium) ￿0.108 (.023)
entire enrollees ￿0.082 (.011)
no experience 18.30 (3.71)
experience year ￿0.343 (.226)
nonpro￿t 18.06 (2.41)
national chain 18.51 (2.29)
group model ￿39.57 (4.19)
sta⁄ model ￿29.92 (5.69)
IPA model ￿31.52 (4.65)
DEMO plan 31.62 (6.72)
cost plan 35.39 (4.36)
cost missing ￿147.8 (8.82)
PPO plan ￿11.69 (7.43)
PFFS plan ￿24.29 (4.61)
PSO plan ￿33.40 (12.6)
POS 31.35 (4.36)
demo factor HMO 346.0 (21.3)
risk factor HMO 149.0 (9.97)
Std FFS per capita cost 0.332 (.014)
medigap premium 0.396 (.046)
ln per capita # hospital ￿2.228 (1.84)
ln per capita # hospital bed ￿4.588 (2.16)
ln hospital expenditure 6.928 (2.24)
impatient days 0.033 (.012)
per capita # medical doctor ￿19.60 (6.25)
county: no hospital ￿22.21 (5.47)
HMO penetration rate 98 68.82 (8.67)
eligibles ￿0.090 (.031)
year: 2004 33.05 (2.12)
constant ￿165.3 (27.4)
R2 0.830
The number of observations: 3,289. Standard errors are in the
parentheses. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are used.
Plan and MSA ￿xed e⁄ects are included in the estimation.
37pro￿ts from entry. Formally, an SPNE strategy in market i, (ye




















￿ 0; if ￿rm j does not enter,
for all j = 1;:::;Ji; where y￿
<j(y￿j) is the solution to the downstream subgame, i.e. the best
responses of the downstream players given X;"<k; and the upstream players￿strategies. The
unique equilibrium solution always exists. Denote this solution, after dropping index i, as
y
￿(X;";￿) ￿ fy is the unique solution in the sequential move game with X;";￿g:
The component unobserved to the econometrician is speci￿ed as
(15) "ji = !￿ji + ￿￿i.
￿ji and ￿i are assumed to be independent of X￿i, and distributed i.i.d. standard normal across
￿rms and markets.25 The heteroskedasticity adjustment in (7) is dropped for simplicity of
explanation. This simpli￿cation does not a⁄ect the argument in this appendix.
The log likelihood function can be written as















i is the observed market con￿guration and ￿ is the vector of parameters, (￿;!;￿). The
probability in the likelihood does not have an analytical form solution due to the multidimen-
25Unlike the previous studies, no normalization such as !2+￿2 = 1 is necessary because the level of pro￿ts
is identi￿ed. Moreover, this speci￿cation of the error components is not crucial for the argument below.
38sional integrals, and, unless the dimension of the unobservables is very small, the numerical
approximation is infeasible. Hence, I use the maximum simulated likelihood (MSL).
The Modi￿ed GHK Simulator The most straightforward simulator for MSL is the crude
frequency simulator. However, such simple discontinuous simulators, which require many
random draws, are practically infeasible, because my data set has at most sixteen players
in some markets and the use of the backward induction technique makes each likelihood
evaluation quite expensive. Here I propose the use of the GHK simulator.
The GHK simulator is a smooth recursive conditioning simulator and is often useful when
the log-likelihood function involves high dimensional integrals with the multivariate normal
distribution. The GHK algorithm draws recursively from truncated univariate normals. It
relies on the decomposition,
f(v1;:::;vJ) = f(v1)f(v2jv1):::f(vJ￿1jvJ￿2;:::;v1)f(vJjvJ￿1;:::;v1);
along with the fact that the conditional normal density can be written as a univariate normal.
The GHK simulator produces probability estimates that are bounded away from 0 and 1.
The estimates are continuous and di⁄erentiable with respect to parameters, because each
contribution is continuous and di⁄erentiable. It is also an unbiased estimator of individual
likelihood, l(￿;!;￿;yo
i;X￿i). It has a smaller variance than the crude frequency simulator,
because each element is bounded away from 0 and 1.
The use of the GHK simulator in a game-theoretic situation, however, is not straightfor-
ward, because the original GHK simulator can deal with interactions across j through the
disturbance structure, but not strategic interactions across j. The use of the GHK simulator
in this study relies on the sequential game assumption. In a sequential move game, the prior
players￿decisions are given for a player. This fact harmonizes the estimation of a sequential
39move game with recursive conditioning simulators, as shown below.
The GHK simulator exploits the Cholesky triangularization to decompose the multivari-
ate normal into a set of univariate normal distributions. The multivariate normal disturbance
vector, "i, can be rewritten as: "i = ￿i￿i, where ￿i is a (Ji + 1) ￿ 1 vector of independent
standard normal variates, ￿i ￿ N(0;IJi+1), and ￿i is a Ji ￿ (Ji + 1) parametric array,26
￿i =
2





... . . .
0 ! ￿
3




Thus, "i can be rewritten as: "i ￿ N(0;￿i), where ￿i is a positive de￿nite matrix, ￿i = ￿i￿0
i.
It follows that "i can be written by using the Cholesky decomposition as:
(17) "i = L(￿i) ￿ vi;
where L(￿) is the lower-triangular Cholesky factor of ￿, or LL0 = ￿, and vi is another
multivariate standard normal vector, vi ￿ N(0;IJi).









This expression involves multiple integrals, which are hard to compute in a straightforward
way. The general objective here is to obtain random draws from the distribution "i subject to
yo = y￿(X;￿;!;￿). To do so, ￿rst rewrite the probability expression that explicitly expresses
26More ￿ exible models can be dealt with by changing ￿i and the size of ￿i.
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Remember the form of the pro￿t function, (12). By de￿ning
aj ￿ a
￿
















(18) can be rewritten as
Pr[y
o = y
￿(X;￿;!;￿)] = Pr[for 8j, aj(y
o;X;"<j;￿) ￿ "j ￿ bj(y
o;X;"<j;￿)]:
This expression shows us the rectangle in which the event, yo = y￿(X;￿;!;￿), occurs. To
obtain the interval of "j, we only need "<j. This is because the upstream ￿rms￿decisions are
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where ￿() is the probability density function of standard normal.
Now we are ready to apply the GHK simulator. For each time of simulation draws,
prepare a vector of independent uniform (0;1) random variates, (u1;:::;uJi). De￿ne the
following function:
(20) q(u;a;b) ￿ ￿
￿1 (￿(a) ￿ (1 ￿ u) + ￿(b) ￿ u), where 0 < u < 1 and ￿ 1 ￿ a < b ￿ 1:
This function, q(￿), is a mapping that takes a uniform (0;1) random variate into a truncated
standard normal random variate on the interval [a;b].
For given yo;X;u;￿;L, de￿ne recursively for j = 1;:::;J:
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L22
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e vJ ￿ q
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a2(e v1) ￿ L2;1e v1
L22
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aJ(e v<J￿1) ￿ LJ;1e v1::: ￿ LJ;J￿1e vJ￿1
LJJ
￿ vJ ￿




Given all the a;b;L; and e v, every Qj is truncated univariate standard normal, so can be






















The model is estimated by solving the following maximum simulated likelihood problem:





























In the computation, I use the Quasi-Newton method with BFGS updating algorithm for
the maximization routine. When I make the random draws for the simulator, I use antithetics
to reduce simulation variance and bias. For more details, see Maruyama (2007).
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